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In the last decades, foreign direct investment (FDI) has increased strongly
among industrialised countries. U.S. companies were the first to set up
foreign affiliates followed later by companies from smaller industrialised
countries. This paper develops a general equilibrium model of bi-
directional intra-industry FDI between industrialised countries, in which
this specific time pattern emerges. In contrast to the existing literature on
FDI, this paper shows that falling transport costs first lead to increased FDI
activities and only later to decreased FDI. Additionally, FDI is more likely
to occur in industries with differentiated products, higher scale economies
on company relative to plant level, smaller inputs of intermediate goods
and more differentiated intermediate goods.
JEL F12.F21.F23
Jbrn Kleinert
The Kiel Institute of World Economics
Diisternbrooker Weg 120
24100 Kiel1. Introduction
Multinational enterprises (MNE) stand at the centre of the new wave of
globalisation. They are a dominant part in each of the different aspects of
globalisation. First, the turnover of foreign affiliates in 1995 was at US$ 7
trillion, exceeding world trade in that year for the first time (The
Economist, 1998). Second, 40% of world trade takes place within
multinational companies (Panic, 1997). Third, a high percentage of world
wide R&D activities is carried out by multinationals. The global payments
of fees and royalties for technology quadrupled to about US$ 48 billion
from 1983 to 1995. In 1995, 80% of these payments flew between parent
companies and their foreign affiliates (World Investment Report, 1997).
Forth, foreign direct investment (FDI) set a new record in 1996. World
wide FDI outflows increased to US$ 347 billion (World Investment
Report, 1997).
FDI is increasingly intra-OECD investment. According to de la Mothe
(1996), in 1991 70%, compared to 51% in 1967 of world wide FDI stock is
cross industrial country investment. A high and increasing share of these
investment are intra industry cross investment (Cantwell and SannaRandaccio, 1992). Factor price arbitrage does not seem to be the crucial
reason behind this development. A large share of FDI is probably better
explained by proximity-concentration theories. That is also supported by
the more than 90% of the output of US affiliates in Europe, Canada and
Japan which are sold within the region (de la Mothe, 1996).
Despite their importance, multinational corporations are still not well
understood in theory. The OLI (Ownership, Location, Internalisation)
paradigm (Dunning 1977, 1988) is dominant in the management literature
on MNE. It has proved to be a useful way of organising almost all known
factors which cause a firm to invest abroad, but it lacks rigorous theoretical
formulation. Literature on the economic theory of multinational companies
is rather new. It started with Markusen (1984) and Helpman (1984). More
recent studies include Brainard (1993), Markusen and Venables (1995) and
Koop (1997).
Markusen and Venables (1995) and Koop (1997) analyse trade, investment
and MNE in a general equilibrium framework using simulation techniques.
"The key idea is that in each of the two countries a homogenous good
which is produced with economies of scale at the plant and at the firmlevel can be produced by exporters and/or multinational firms" (Koop,
1997: 5)
This paper keeps to the tradition of Brainard (1993) in that, a homogenous
and a differentiated goods sector are modelled. That makes the results
directly comparable to the findings of new trade theory. The differentiated
goods sector is made up of companies producing final goods and
companies producing intermediate goods. These companies engage in
monopolistic competition within their groups. Since intermediate goods
are often very specific to a production process or final goods, it is assumed
that final product firms exclusively use intermediate goods from their
home country. The final goods producer in the differentiated goods sector
produces in a multi-stage process that includes fixed inputs at the corporate
level (R&D, marketing, financing) and at the plant level. The variable
costs incurred in production include the costs for the input of intermediate
goods and factor costs of skilled and unskilled labour. Final goods
producing companies in the differentiated goods sector choose between
exports and production abroad to serve the foreign market. Export saves on
additional fixed costs at the plant level, while production abroad saves on
transport costs.Only economies with identical relative factor endowments are examined,
although the examination could be extended to different relative factor
endowments. This is intended to exclude effects which result from factor
price differentials, because these are not the driving force behind
developed countries' cross foreign direct investment. The paper goes
beyond Brainard (1993) in (i) that it allows for differences in absolute
factor endowments of both countries, which make numerical simulation
necessary but gives richer insight in the complexity of the investment
decision; (ii) the introduction of an intermediate goods sector; (iii) that
conditions of competition are changed by letting transport costs decrease
throughout the simulation.
In models of FDI so far, FDI increases if transport costs increase. But this
theoretical prediction is at odd with the facts. In the last decades transport
and communication costs fell and FDI increased. Moreover, existing
models are hardly able to explain the time pattern of FDI with investment
first by U.S. companies, later by companies from other industrial countries
and recently also from industrialising countries.It is the central aim of this paper to present a model of bi-directional intra
industry FDI which is able to reproduce these basic stylized facts of FDI
development in past decades.
In addition to political factors, globalisation is driven by falling transport
and communication costs. The simulations in this paper mimic reality by
letting transport costs decrease. Transport costs affect the profitability of a
company's foreign direct investment. Through variation of different model
parameter simulations identify determinants of a company's investment
decision. A trigger curve is introduced to present the profitability change
of FDI. If the trigger curve exceeds zero, investment in the foreign market
is profitable.
The major results of the simulation runs can be summarised as follows:
The profitability of FDI differs between industries. It is more profitable to
invest abroad for a highly differentiated industry than for industries
producing less differentiated goods. Further, the emergence of
multinational companies is accelerated by a higher share of fixed costs at
the company level relative to the plant level and slowed down by an
increasing amount of intermediate goods used in production. Theinvestment decision is also influenced by the type of intermediate goods.
Highly differentiated intermediate goods accelerate investment in the
foreign country.
If economies differ in size, the companies in the larger country invest
abroad first. For companies in the smaller country investment only
becomes profitable, if transport costs are falling further. It may also be the
case that it is never profitable for those firms although they produce with
the same technology as the companies in the larger country.
2. The Model
Consider two countries, G and K, each with two sectors of production. One
sector, agriculture, produces a homogenous product QA with constant
returns to scale under perfect competition. The other sector,
manufacturing, produces a variety of final goods and a variety of
intermediate goods under imperfect competition. The aggregate amount of
output of the final goods in the manufacturing sector is QM . Each firm
produces only a single variety /; output is denoted <?,. The final goods
producer, which can serve the foreign market through exports, or
production abroad, uses intermediate goods, which are also produced in themanufacturing sector. The aggregate amount of output of the intermediate
goods Z is used as input exclusively by the final goods producer
headquartered in the same country. An individual intermediate firm's
output is denoted z\. The structure of the production side of the economy is
shown in Figure 1.




















It is assumed that every individual is either endowed with one unit of
unskilled labour L or one unit of skilled labour H. Labour is perfectly
mobile within national economies. However, there is no cross-border
mobility of labour. The labour market equilibria give wage levels forunskilled and skilled labour Wj,Vj in country j. Full employment is
assumed.
Consumption
Nj inhabitants live in each country j. They have identical preferences.




(A gives the income share spent on manufacturing goods. The aggregate
QM is a CES-function with A different products.
QMJ = I- p pe(0,l);j = G,K (2)
p defines the degree of differentiation of the manufacturing goods. The
products are poor substitutes for each other if p is small, leaving the
companies with more market power. If p increases, it is easier for
consumers to substitute one good for the other, therefore market power
decreases.Equation (2) implies that consumers love variety. If they are indifferent to
two products, they prefer a mix of half a unit of each good. The CES-
function (2) implies a constant elasticity of substitution a, with a = ,
1-p
between any two varieties of the manufacturing products.
Individuals maximise their utility (1) subject to budget constraints
X




to obtain the optimum quantities of agricultural and manufacturing goods.
QAJ=(l-fi)Yj/pAJ j=G,K (4)
QM,j=VYjlPM,j J = G,K (5)
pAj is the price of agricultural goods, p^fj is the price-index of the
varieties of manufacturing goods. It depends on the price of every
individual product.
Since agriculture stands for the perfectly competitive sector of economy
and the agricultural good can be traded without costs, the price of the
agricultural product will be the same in both economies and set to 1. The10
agricultural good QA will therefore be used as numeraire throughout this
paper.
Production
The agricultural good is assumed to be produced under constant returns.
•-01 (6)
Since agriculture is a perfect competition sector wages Wj and salaries Vj
are paid according to the marginal products of the production factors
unskilled and skilled labour, respectively.
(7)
dHAJ
Perfect mobility of workers across sectors, assures that wages and salaries
are identical in every sector of the economy.
For a Cobb-Douglas technology the production function can be
transformed into a cost function. For the remainder of this paper,
technology is described by the cost function.
Production costs in agriculture are given by11
In the manufacturing sector, companies are engaged in monopolistic
competition. Consumers view the differentiated products as imperfect
substitutes. Each company produces a single variety. Hence, the number of
differentiated goods equals the number of firms in the two countries.
There are two groups of firms in the manufacturing sector, intermediate
goods producers and final goods producers. The final goods producers use
a bundle of intermediate goods as input in their production. Since
intermediate goods are often very specific to a production process or final
good, the production of this final good in a foreign market depends on the
supply of intermediate goods from the home market. For the sake of
simplicy, it is assumed that MNEs exclusively use intermediate goods
produced in their home market irrespective of whether production of the
final good occurs in the home or in the foreign market.
The intermediate goods are not perfect substitutes for each other. The
bundle of intermediate goods used by any firm in the manufacturing sector
contains all varieties of intermediate goods.12
j = G,K;ee (0,1) (9)
Aggregation is again assumed to be a CES function. The intermediate
goods' degree of differentiation depends on e. Sj is the number of
intermediate goods produced in country j.
The price-index pzj for intermediate goods can be calculated from (9)
1.
=[s jPz,i,j j = G,K (10)
where (p = . s, is the number of varieties of the intermediate goods in
l-e
 J
the bundle Zj, PZJJ is
 tn
e price of any of these varieties.
The costs of production of an intermediate good variety follow the cost
function





7 = G,/T and 02'03
The first term of the right hand side gives the fixed costs, fzj is the level
of fixed costs given by the production technology. The second term
describes the marginal costs c%; multiplied by the output ZJJ • Because all
producers of intermediate goods face the same factor costs and use the
same technology, their marginal costs and their fixed costs are identical.
The amount spent on intermediate goods of country j by the final goods
producer is denoted Ij. From the composition of the aggregate
intermediate good (9), the demand of any of the varieties can be derived.
(12)
In an equilibrium, demand for the intermediate good equals its production.
The output of an intermediate goods producer decreases, therefore, in its
own price Pz,ij, and increases in the price-index of intermediate goods14
ij and the demand for intermediate goods from the final goods producer
';•
Maximising the profit function of an intermediate goods producer
)-CZFJ j = G,K (13)
yields the optimal price of his intermediate good
Pz,ij=cz,j'e- j = G,K (14)
The producers of intermediate goods set their prices \Z£ over their
marginal costs cZj- These prices are identical, because their marginal
costs are identical as well as the outputs z\ •
The number of intermediate goods firms Sj is determined by the zero-
profit-condition.
Y\f = (I-e)PzjZj-CZFJ= 0 (15)
Since there is free market entry and exit in both countries in this model,
new companies will enter profitable markets until profits fall to 0. New15
entrants influence the profit of existing firms by increasing competition:
the price index (11) decreases as a result. In equilibrium, the zero-profit
condition holds.
Equation (10) gives the price-index for a home based plant of a final good
producer. The price-index of affiliates in the foreign country pz ,• must
take the transport costs (T^D) into account.
=['J{PZ.J'™
D)
Transport costs are modelled according to Samuelson's 'iceberg' form: a
part of the value of every product must be paid for transportation. This
value increases with the distance D between the two markets (which is set
to 1 for the remainder of this paper). To buy one unit of an imported
intermediate good, e
TM (> 1) units have to be paid by the producer of the
final good in the foreign country, \e
TM -1) units being transport costs.
There are two possible types of final goods producers in every country: (i)
national firms producing in their home market and serving the foreign
country through exports and (ii) multinational companies producing16
domestically and abroad. For the sake of simplicity, exports of the
multinational companies affiliates to the home country are excluded.
The final goods producers manufacture their products in a multi-stage
process. In the first stage, headquarter services are produced in each firm.
The headquarter service has the character of public goods within the
company. In the second stage, actual production takes place at the plant.
Therefore headquarter services and intermediate goods are used as inputs
in the second stage.
In the first stage, a headquarter-service is produced with unskilled and
skilled labour. The cost function of any final good producer is given by
l~°
4
'J J = O,K;64em (17)
rj is the level of headquarter-services produced by the companies in
country j. In the second stage, at the plant level, the companies produce
with fixed and variable input factors. The cost function of the fixed inputs
cPF,i,j are17
2
/,• is the level of fixed input necessary for the production of final good. r.
and /. are determined by the production technology and, therefore,
exogenous to the company.
The costs of variable inputs Cpy ,• ,• of a plant of a national company in j is
given by
N _ _
i = G,K and 9*,96 e
Variable costs Cpyjj, increase in the factor prices of unskilled and
skilled labour vvy,vy in country y, the price-index of the intermediate
goods pzj in country j and the output level <?,•;.
Different plants of multinational companies have different variable costs
Cpy i • h in each country because of different wages (w. ^ w/rv: ^ v^)
and different prices of the intermediate goods \pzf / pz/) in both18
markets. A multinational company's variable costs of production in the
home-country j, Cpyjjj, are
e5) {06J {i-es-
= G,K and 05,06e(0,1)
The variable costs of production in h of a multinational firm headquartered
[nJ
 cPV,i,j.h a*
j = G,K;h = G,K and 0s,d6e(0,l);j * h
A multinational company's variable costs abroad depend on the wage rates
of unskilled and skilled labour w^,v^ in the foreign country h, the
elasticities of production #5,#6 (technology used) and the costs of the
intermediate goods pz; (including transport costs from the home
country). The output qfj (k = N,MJ = G,K) differs between domestic19
suppliers and MNE in the same country as well as between MNE affiliates
in the MNE's home country and the affiliates in the foreign country.
In equilibrium, companies produce the amount of goods they can sell for
the optimal price. Given the utility function (1) and the composition of the
aggregated manufacturing good (2), equation (22) gives the demand for





= G,K;h = G,K and




n final goods markets and the transport
costs TM • The lower the price of good i relative to the price-index in both
countries, the higher the optimal output. High transport costs decrease the
optimal output by increasing the sales price in the foreign market.
Consumers in the importing country h must pay the transport costs and
react therefore by partially substituting imported goods for goods produced
in their country h.20
A multinational firm headquartered in j produces in both countries. It
supplies goods which are produced within each country. The optimal






J = G,K (23)
equals the demand in the home country, since re-export is excluded.
The price of a multinational company's goods in the foreign market h are












e output in h of a multinational company / with Headquarters in
j. It is positively related to the price-index and the market size (XY^ in
country h and negatively related to its own price.
The quantity of the intermediate goods-bundle used by a single final goods
producer can be calculated from the variable cost functions (19) - (21) by21
taking the partial derivative with respect to the price-index pzj (Shephards
lemma).
M <K-py,i,j,j °<~PV,i,j,lt _ M ...M
=0-95-0.^1 i^i F^H tij.}
In equilibrium the aggregate demand for intermediate goods
ilj equals the aggregate supply [ZA. The total costs for +
1 M
intermediate goods X PZ jQ

















The solution to this maximisation-problem is always a fixed mark-up
factor over marginal costs c
p£j = cpvj IP j = G,K;k = N,M (29)
The price of a single final good depends only on the good's marginal costs
Cpy and p, the parameter of differentiation. Marginal costs can easily be
obtained from the variable costs (17)-(21). Since all companies use the
same technology, the marginal costs differ only if factor prices differ. But
factor prices can not differ within one country, because there is inter-
sectoral mobility [Pjj = Pijjj-
In each country j there are four different potential supplier of final
manufacturing goods, (i) National firms of country j producing for their
home market, (ii) Foreign firms serving country j through exports, (iii)23
MNEs with their headquarters in country j producing at their plant in; and
(iv) MNEs with the headquarter in country h producing at their affiliate in
country j.
Prices set by companies located in G and K differ as result of different
marginal costs caused by different factor costs. Prices set by national and
multinational enterprises also differ in the foreign market but not at home.
There are therefore up to three different prices p. .
(j = G,K;h = G,K;j*hand k=N, NT) in each country h: price of goods
produced by j based firms (nationals and multinationals), imported goods
and goods produced by an /z-headquartered multinational firm's plant in;'.
The price of a national firm's good in the foreign market p
N/{ equals the
home-market price multiplied by the transportation costs





Using the different product prices of the different companies, the price








rij is the number of national companies, located in j, n^ the number of
nationals located in h, m; and m^ are the numbers of multinationals
headquartered in j and h, respectively. «,-, n/,, m; and m/, add up to A.
Since there is free market entry and exit, in equilibrium the zero-profit
condition holds for national and multinational companies.
"?f-CW,-CV,=0 (32)
and25
nf = (1 - pipfflf, + pfofj,) - CHqj - CfFJ - CPFM = 0 (33)
The zero-profit-conditions (32) and (33) are sufficient to determine the
number of national firms rij and multinational firms nij ?
Investment Decision
All final goods producers can decide whether to serve the foreign market
through exports or to become a MNE and to produce abroad. If there are
no restrictions to FDI, a company will invest in the foreign market if it is
profitable to do so.
The price of the good drops in the foreign market, when an exporting
company becomes a multinational, since there are only transport costs on
the intermediate good but not on the final good. The quantity sold rises as
do variable profits.
2 In general, there is no simple solution to the number of companies in both countries. But
there are some special cases where an expression for the number of companies can be
derived (see Brainard, 1993).26
A national final goods producer decides to invest in a foreign country if the
gains in variable profits are at least as high as the additional fixed costs at
the plant level.
CPFJl < (1 - P){pfjqf,j + p»hq»h - PUI ) (34)
j = G,K\H = G,K j*h
The lower the fixed costs at the plant level Cpp ^, the sooner a national
firm will decide to build a plant abroad. Not clear is the influence of the
transport costs. The last term of the right hand side increases with lower
transport costs, because q .• increases. But the second term from the right
increases as well. The net effect depends on the parameters. The influence
of p is also ambiguous. The first factor on the right hand side of equation
(34) will increase, as product differentiation increases (falling p). That
accelerates investment. But Aq = q,- ,• +<7, ^ —qj is influenced by p, as
well. A smaller p implies a smaller Aq, and therefore a smaller increase in
variable profits. Therefore, the influence of p on the investment decision
depends on the specific value of the parameters.27
One company's investment in the foreign market intensifies competition
for all companies in this market. It produces the same effect as the entry of
a new firm, the price index decreases.
Multinational companies are free to divest in the foreign country and serve
consumers there instead through exports. Fixed costs at the plant-level are
sunk-costs, but if the revenue of a MNE is smaller than the revenue of a
national company,
it is profitable for a company to divest. Factor prices for labour and skilled
labour must be much cheaper in country j compared to country h to make
up for the additional transport costs.
Factor Demand
Factor demand is derived by Shepards Lemma. The cost functions (8), (11)
and (17) through (21) are differentiated with respect to the factor price.
The derivation of the unskilled and skilled labour demand is shown in the
appendix.28
Market Equilibrium
Full employment of all resources is assumed in both economies. For a







 LPV,j + H,j
M ' (36)










Hqj + HPFJ + Hfrjj) (37)
Wages and salaries are set as to clear factor markets in each country. The
wage level determines the size of the agricultural sector because this is a
perfectly competitive industry. In both countries the price of agricultural
goods is equal to marginal costs.
PA,j=cA,j j = G,K (38)29
The income Yj in each country is given by the sum of the income of each
individual.
Yj=WjLj + VjHj j = G,K (39)
The demand functions (4) and (5), the income equation (39) and the budget
constraint (3) ensure that goods markets clear. The factor market clearance
is given by (36) and (37). The value of the marginal products of unskilled
and skilled labour (7) determines the wages in each economy.
The pricing rule (29) and the equations (22) to (24), (32) and (33), define
the output of the national and multinational firms and their number in each
country. The number of intermediate goods firms and their production
levels are given by (14), (12) and (15).
The pricing rule (38) sets the agricultural goods output in each economy
and therefore the level of inter-industry trade. The costless one-way trade
of the homogenous good leads to price equality of this good in both
economies.
There is always intra-industry trade in final products, because the final
goods are not perfect substitutes for one another. The quantities q , sold30




Njh j = G,K;h = G, K;j±h (40)
The existence of multinational enterprises and, therefore, the trade of
services, depends on fixed costs on both the company and the plant levels,
market size and transport costs. Trade in services equals
Since this is a static model, trade must be balanced, otherwise one country
would be giving away goods for free.
Exf + Exf + Ex
Sj = Exjf + Ex
Sh j = G,K;h = G,KJ * h (42)
Ex can be positive or negative, depending on whether j is an exporter or
an importer of the agricultural good. Ex must be positive for both
economies except in the case of prohibitive high transport costs rM. Ex
S31
can be 0 or positive for both countries depending on the existence of
multinational companies.
3. Simulation Results: When Do National Companies Invest in
a Foreign Market?
To analyse the determinants on bi-directional intra-industry foreign direct
investment in industrialised countries the model described in section 2 is
simulated for different scenarios. Since the influence of relative factor
endowment differences is not the focus of this paper, a constant unskilled-
skilled labour endowment ratio of 3:1 across countries is assumed.
To make the changes in profitability of FDI visible a trigger curve of
investment is derived form the investment decision (34).
* - 0 - Pipfau
 + pfafj, - Phi) - CpF,h (43)
The first two terms describe the change in variable profits resulting from
investment, the last term describes fixed costs. 0 is positive if profits are
increased by FDI. The company invests abroad if 0 is greater than 0, since32
companies are assumed to maximise profit. 0 shows the incentive for a
company fromy to invest in the foreign country h.
0 in (43) is derived using a price index with national companies only.
Hence, the trigger curve (43) is only valid before the investment of any
company has occurred. One company's FDI changes the price index (30),
the optimal output conditions (22) through (26) and, therefore, the
investment decision (34) and the trigger curve (43).
The focus of this paper is the point where international investment
becomes profitable. That is the point where the trigger curve crosses the
zero line. It is examined how this point is influenced by the variation of the
different parameters. If the value of the trigger curve is positive and at least
one company decides to invest in the foreign market the trigger curve (43)
is not valid any more, because its derivation used a price index with only
national companies. The consequences of one company's investment in the
foreign market is beyond the scope of this paper. Here, the determinants of
initial investment are considered. To separate the different influences,
equilibria with only national companies are employed.33
The following simulations begin at very high transport cost levels. There is
no inter-industry trade, since the two countries have the same relative
factor endowments. Due to high transport costs, there is no trade in
differentiated final goods. The countries are autarkic. Factor prices are
identical in both countries. There is no incentive to invest in the foreign
country, because high transport costs leads to high intermediate goods
prices.
Scenario 1: The Influence of Transport Costs
Transport costs fall in this scenario. As a result, intra-industry trade rises
between the two countries. Transport costs prevent price equalisation.
Hence factor prices differ in both countries and inter-industry trade arises.
Falling transport costs raise profit from FDI because home-supplied
intermediate goods become cheaper abroad.34
Figure 3.1: The Influence of Transport Costs
transport costs
Figure 3.1 shows the trigger curve for equilibria with two identical
countries 1 and 2
3. It is profitable for companies in both countries to invest
in the foreign market if the transport costs are not too high, but not too
low, either. In the case of high transport costs intermediate goods from the
home country are very expensive and production abroad, therefore, is not
profitable. If transport costs are very low, the company does not save
enough on transport costs which would make up for the additional fixed
costs for the second plant. Hence it is not profitable to invest.
3 The parameters which are used to derive the trigger curves in scenario 1 to 6 are given in the
Appendix.35
Scenario 2: The Influence of Transport Costs when Countries Differ in
Size
To allow for differences in absolute, but not in relative factor endowments,
the size of country 2 is reduced to two third of the size of country 1. This
changes the investment decision for both countries. Now, <P differs
between the two economies.
(44)
(45)
Figure 3.2: The Influence of Transport Costs when Countries Differ in Size
transport costs36
Figure 3.2 shows the new trigger-curves <J>j and <J>2
 m comparison to the
trigger curve 0 of 3.1. All trigger curves increase with falling transport
costs until transport costs fall below a certain point (r M ~ 0.6) and
decrease thereafter. 4>2'
 m
e larger country's trigger curve lies above 0.
FDI is profitable at a higher level of transport costs for companies based in
the larger country 1 (r^ = l.l), compared to those in the smaller country 2
(
T M ~ 0-94), because they enjoy a cost advantage that stems from higher
economies of scale in their larger home market. The actually valid part of
these trigger curves is only the part of the right of the point where the
trigger curve of the larger country 1 crosses the zero line. At this point,
country l's companies investment in the smaller country 2 becomes
profitable. MNE emerge since profit maximisation is assumed. That
changes the price index (30) and, therefore, the trigger curve (43). The rest
of the trigger curve stays valid only if the companies of country 1 do not
invest.37
Scenario 3: The Influence of Transport Costs on Various Industries in
Economies of Different Size
If industries are characterised by different degrees of product
differentiation p, the trigger curve differs by industry. The degree of
differentiation determines the economies of scale enjoyed by the
companies. Figure 3.3 shows trigger curves for the larger and the smaller
country for different parameters p.
Figure 3.3: The Influence of Transport Costs on Various Industries of
Economies of Different Size
<E>,:p = 0.6
transport costs
The point where the trigger curve <P crosses the rM -axis differs from
industry to industry. FDI is profitable at higher levels of transport costs for38
industries that are characterised by higher product differentiation (lower p)
because this translates to greater economies of scale. To make FDI of an
industry with very low economies of scale profitable, transport costs have
to fall to a very low level. It is not profitable for a company in a less
differentiated sector (p = 0.8 and p = 0.9) from the smaller country to
invest in the larger country at any transportation costs level.
Scenario 4: The Influence of Transport Costs when Fixed Costs Vary
In this scenario the ratio of fixed costs at the company level to plant level
is varied while the absolute level of fixed costs is kept constant. High
(total) fixed costs are a barrier to entry, because of the zero-profit-function
(32), but in the trigger curve function (43) only the plant fixed costs are
included. Equation (32) does not change but the trigger function shifts
outward with a higher share of fixed costs at the company level. Company
level services are public goods within the company. The profitability of an
investment increases with the level of services which can be used at no
additional costs by the second plant.
The total fixed costs in all three cases shown in Figure 3.4 are identical.
The variation in the distribution of plant and company fixed costs strongly39
effects the profitability to invest in a foreign country. Increasing returns
resulting from high fixed costs at the plant level favour exports since the
concentration advantage of production is large compared to transport costs.
Figure 3.4: The Influence of Transport Costs when Fixed Costs Vary
transport costs
= l/ = l;O2:r =
High fixed costs at the company level favour foreign direct investment
since the exploitation of the headquarter-service is not restricted to one
production site. The ability to split the production process is an important
requirement for investment abroad.40
Scenario 5: The Influence of Transport Costs on Various Industries with
Different Cost Share Spent on Intermediate Goods
The complexity of the production process influences the decision between
investment and export, too. The amount of intermediate goods used in the
production of the final good characterises the complexity of the production
process in this model. The cost share spent on intermediate goods
(ig = 1-65-6$) varies in Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5: The Influence of Transport Costs on Industries with Different






(ig = 0.2: 04 = 0.55;65 = 0.25, ig = 0.3: 04 = 05;65 = 0.2
and ig = 0.4: 64 = 0.4; 65 = 0.2)41
ig stands for the intermediate goods cost share of a company's variable
costs. The higher the cost share of intermediate goods the less likely is an
investment in the foreign market. As in the scenarios above, there is an
advantage for companies from the larger country.
Scenario 6: The Influence of Transport Costs when the Intermediate
Goods'Differentiation Varies
The kind of intermediate goods is understood in this scenario as their
degree of differentiation. In Figure 3.6, the differentiation parameter £ of
intermediate goods is varied.









The variation of e, the degree of differentiation of the intermediate good,
has influence on the investment decision in both countries. Investment in
the smaller country by firms from larger countries is eased by more
differentiated intermediate inputs (smaller e). The trigger curve 3>i crosses
the zero-line only for e = 0.8. For the foreign investment of companies
from the smaller country the opposite is true. The trigger curve <l>2 lies
lower for e = 0.8 than e = 0.9.
4. Conclusion
Determinants of FDI and the emergence of MNEs have been analysed in a
general equilibrium framework that was solved by simulations. The
profitability of investment in the foreign market and, therefore, the
possible emergence of multinational companies increases with decreasing
transport costs up to a certain point and decreases thereafter. However, it
depends on several factors, whether the investment in a foreign country
actually is profitable.
Firstly, the profitability is influenced by the size of its home market
relative to that of the foreign market. Companies in the larger country43
invest at higher transport costs than countries headquartered in the smaller
country. That matches the history of FDI after World War II. U.S.
companies took the initiative in the internationalisation process in most
industries, followed with a time lag by European, Japanese and Canadian
companies.
Secondly, product differentiation influences the investment decision.
Companies which produce highly differentiated goods are more likely to
become multinational. It can be observed, that FDI and multinational
companies are dominant in few industries such as chemicals,
Pharmaceuticals, electronics and motor vehicles, which are industries with
imperfect competition and differentiated goods.
Thirdly, product differentiation is necessary but not sufficient. The ability
to split the fixed costs from the production process is important for the
emergence of multinational corporations. In this model, all fixed costs that
can be separated from production process are headquarter-fixed costs. If
these are high compared to the fixed costs at the plant level, investment in
the foreign market is more likely. The relatively moderate FDI in
machinery in spite of highly differentiated goods in this industry is due to44
its high content of tacit knowledge. Fixed costs that can not be separated
from production process (fixed costs at the plant level) are high compared
to fixed costs at the corporate level. In other industries, high fixed costs at
the plant level relative to transport costs result in a high concentration
advantage. That seems to be the case in the shipbuilding industry, as a very
extreme case, since the transport costs of the final product are close to
zero. In the steel industry, transport costs are high, but are outweighed by
the high concentration advantage resulting from high fixed costs at the
plant level.
Finally, companies with complex production processes (high proportion of
intermediate goods) tend to stay national longer. The kind of intermediate
goods used is of importance, too. Production which uses very
differentiated intermediate goods internationalises earlier.45
Appendix
Ij is the expenditure on intermediate goods. The optimal quantity of any
variety bought by the final good producer is obtained through
























Taking the sum over all h=l.. Sj products gives






































Taking the sum over all h = l..Sj and substituting into (A.3) gives
j I 7
,iJ (A.12)48











By solving for the aggregate the price index of the intermediate goods




Derivation of the labour demand






j = G,K;84 e(0,l); * = N,M
(0,1)















Due to the iceberg-form of the transport costs, a share tj of final goods is













The export of intermediate goods contains
units of labour with
The same differentiation can be made for skilled labour.



















j = G,K;63e (0,1) (A.30)
Table Al: Parameters for the Derivation of the Trigger Curve in the
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